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Introduction
What are delusions? It is common to define delusions as implausible beliefs that are held 
with conviction but for which there is little empirical support. 
Delusion. A false belief based on incorrect inference about external reality 
that is firmly sustained despite what almost everyone else believes and de-
spite what constitutes incontrovertible and obvious proof or evidence to the 
contrary. The belief is not one ordinarily accepted by other members of the 
person’s culture or subculture (e.g., it is not an article of religious faith). When 
ABSTRACT
In this paper we have two main aims. First, we present an account of mood-congruent delu-
sions in depression (hereafter, depressive delusions). We propose that depressive delusions 
constitute acknowledgements of self-related beliefs acquired as a result of a negatively 
biased learning process. Second, we argue that depressive delusions have the potential 
for psychological and epistemic benefits despite their obvious epistemic and psychological 
costs. We suggest that depressive delusions play an important role in preserving a person’s 
overall coherence and narrative identity at a critical time, and thus can be regarded as epis-
temically innocent. 
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RESUMO
Nesse artigo temos dois objetivos principais: primeiro, sugerimos um modo de compreen-
der delírios congruentes com o humor na depressão (doravante, delírios depressivos) e 
como estes se distinguem de delírios na esquizofrenia; segundo, investigamos se delírios 
depressivos podem trazer benefícios epistêmicos e psicológicos. Propomos que delírios 
depressivos emergem como resultado de um processo de aprendizado negativamente en-
viesado e constituem um reconhecimento de informação sobre o sujeito que é adquirido 
como resultado desse processo de aprendizado. Argumentamos que delírios depressivos 
desempenham um importante papel na preservação da coerência e da identidade narrativa 
de agentes em momentos de crise.
Palavras-chave: depressão, delírio, esquema, aprendizagem, ansiedade, dissonância cog-
nitiva, inocência epistêmica.
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a false belief involves a value judgment, 
it is regarded as a delusion only when the 
judgment is so extreme as to defy credibility 
(APA, 2013, p. 819).
For instance, Leslie who has delusions of persecution 
may come to believe that other people intend to cause her 
harm. Such a delusion has epistemic and psychological costs 
for Leslie. By interpreting many of her experiences in the light 
of her delusions, Leslie misrepresents the intentions of her 
family members and colleagues, and comes to regard their 
behaviour towards her as more hostile than it really is. Per-
secutory delusions also have a negative effect on Leslie’s well-
being by contributing to her increasing distress and anxiety. 
Apart from persecution, common delusional content found 
in depression involves guilt, illness, and loss of one’s financial 
integrity.
Delusions of guilt articulate the concern to 
have lost one’s moral integrity, that is, one’s 
commitment to be there for the others. 
Delusions of illness express the concern to 
have lost one’s physical integrity, the worry 
not to be autonomous and to be a burden 
for the others. Finally, delusions of ruin are 
about the concern to have lost one’s finan-
cial integrity, thus, the worry to get the oth-
ers involved in one’s bankruptcy (Stanghell-
ini and Raballo, 2015, p. 174).
Delusions in general, and delusions of persecution in 
particular, have been the object of extensive psychological 
and phenomenological research (Freeman et al., 2001; Boyd 
and Gumley, 2007; Campbell and Morrison, 2007; Freeman, 
2007; Freeman et al., 2008), and they have recently become 
a subject of philosophical investigation as well (Bortolotti, 
2009; Radden, 2010; Gerrans, 2014). Most of the literature 
concentrates on delusional experience as part of schizophre-
nia or of the wider category of psychosis. But some of the re-
cent research on depression (e.g., by Stanghellini and Raballo, 
2015) suggests that delusions also emerge in the context of 
major depressive disorders and present different characteris-
tics from those found in psychosis. 
In this paper we are interested in the nature of depres-
sive delusions and ask whether they have some benefits de-
spite their obvious epistemic and psychological costs. Here 
is our plan. In the section “Schizophrenic delusions versus 
depressive delusions”, we describe what the existing literature 
identifies as different features in schizophrenic and depressive 
delusions. In the section “Learning about the self in depres-
sion”, we consider cognitive distortions in the learning process-
es that may contribute to severe depression. In “A hypothesis 
about the development of depressive delusions”, we argue that 
the content of depressive delusions is related to the content 
of those beliefs that people acquire about themselves due to 
negatively biased learning. In the fifth section, “Psychologi-
cal and epistemic benefits of depressive delusions”, we suggest 
that depressive delusions are acknowledgments of previously 
acquired self-related beliefs and we maintain that, despite its 
costs, the adoption of depressive delusions also has some psy-
chological and epistemic benefits. Depressive delusions can 
reduce anxiety caused by inconsistent cognitions, and can 
also be viewed as epistemically innocent, where epistemic in-
nocence is a property of epistemically costly cognitions that 
have significant epistemic benefits and whose benefits cannot 
be easily attained via less costly cognitions.
Schizophrenic delusions versus 
depressive delusions
A severe form of depression, sometimes called psychotic 
depression or depressive psychosis, is a major depressive episode 
that is accompanied by psychotic symptoms such as delusions 
and hallucinations (Hales and Yudofsky, 2003; Gerretsen et 
al., 2015) as well as by intense depressive symptoms, including 
very low mood, lack of interest in everyday matters, problems 
with sleeping, feelings of guilt, and obsessive self-accusations. 
The vast majority of delusions appearing in severe de-
pression are mood-congruent, which means that their content 
matches the mood experienced by the person (Hales and 
Yudofsky, 2003). According to the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (APA, 2013), common themes 
of depressive delusions are persecution, guilt, punishment, 
personal inadequacy, or disease, with half of the affected peo-
ple experiencing delusions with more than one theme. It has 
been estimated that depression involving delusions occurs in 
16% to 54% of people suffering from depression (Rothschild 
et al., 1999).
It is a matter of dispute whether depression involving 
delusions is a severe form of unipolar depression (sometimes 
also referred to as melancholia) or a condition that falls into 
the broader category of psychosis (see for instance: Frances 
et al., 1981; Parker et al., 1992). One argument for the latter 
hypothesis comes from empirical research showing that peo-
ple suffering from these severe forms of depression do not 
get better with antidepressant medication alone (Brown et 
al., 1982). Other researchers (e.g., Nelson and Bowers, 1978), 
however, argue on the basis of clinical studies that depression 
involving delusions should be understood as a sub-type of ma-
jor depressive disorder and that it is continuous with, and not 
detached from, other forms of depressive illness. Stanghellini 
and Raballo (2015) provide further support for this claim and 
point to several differences between schizophrenic and depres-
sive delusions. According to them, delusions that emerge in 
schizophrenia take the form of a revelation by uncovering 
some new content, unfamiliar to the person, whereas delusions 
that emerge in depression confirm self-related information 
that is already known and familiar.
This seems to be an important point. According to 
Stanghellini and Raballo (2015), the experience of schizo-
phrenic delusions amounts to being struck with a ‘something’ 
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that opens up a new meaning, a new identity, or a new under-
standing of the world that is deeper and more personal. This 
new awareness manifests as a sudden disclosure (Stanghell-
ini and Ballerini, 1992), or as a kind of aesthetic experience 
(Parnas, 2013). The revelation follows a phase of uncertainty 
and tension and signals a radical change. The revelation is the 
‘dawn of a new reality’ (Stanghellini and Rosfort, 2013). 
This feature of schizophrenic delusions has been captured 
by several other authors in the classic literature on schizophre-
nia. Karl Jaspers (1963) spoke of how endorsing the delusional 
content puts an end to a long period of uncertainty. 
This general delusional atmosphere with all 
its vagueness of content must be unbear-
able. Patients obviously suffer terribly un-
der it and to reach some definite idea at 
last is like being relieved from some enor-
mous burden […] The achievement brings 
strength and comfort […] No dread is worse 
than that of danger unknown (Jaspers, 
1963, p. 98).
And Klaus Conrad introduced the concept of ‘apopha-
ny’, the manifestation of a meaningfulness that was previously 
hidden. Here is a case study on which Conrad relied for his 
analysis of delusions as a revelation:
Due to possible psychosis, a 32-year-old 
first-class private, Karl B., was brought to Dr 
Conrad’s hospital. In his interview with Con-
rad, the patient reports that “everything 
begins” one morning as his unit breaks to 
leave camp. When the sergeant asks him for 
the key to his quarters, it is suddenly clear to 
him that it is a ploy to “test” him. While de-
parting in the bus, he notices that his com-
rades are behaving strangely: They know 
something that he is not supposed to know. 
One of his comrades asks “conspicuously” 
if he has any bread. At midday, they arrive 
in a town to relieve units positioned there. 
A few in his company are charged with find-
ing quarters for the rest of them. This is only 
a ruse for the few to receive instructions in 
how to deal with him while he waits with the 
others in the motor coach. One after anoth-
er, groups of men leave the coach only for 
the others to return. “It is clear that they are 
all receiving their instructions” about him. 
The patient is unable to explain how he sees 
this. He simply “sees it” (Mishara, 2010, 
p. 9, our emphasis). 
In schizophrenic delusions new content is revealed. Peo-
ple affected by schizophrenia often describe the adoption of 
the delusion as a discovery, such as the discovery of the true 
meaning of life, or of a new purpose for humanity (Stang-
hellini and Raballo, 2015, p. 173), although delusions can and 
often do incorporate aspects of the person’s everyday reality 
and past experience (see for instance Parnas and Sass, 2001; 
Freeman et al., 2008). 
Do depressive delusions share the same features as 
schizophrenic delusions? Not quite. There is wide agreement 
that depressive delusions confirm the person’s previously ac-
quired self-related beliefs and her feelings (see Kraus, 1983), 
instead of manifesting as a revelation or as the discovery of 
something new. Delusions of guilt in severe depression may 
validate a feeling of guilt and confirm the person’s conviction 
that she has done something wrong. The idea that depressive 
delusions are preceded by moods and beliefs that are congru-
ent with their content has been put forward in several con-
texts. For instance, Matthew Ratcliffe (2008), who adopts the 
Heidegger-inspired term ‘existential feelings’ to describe what 
the clinical literature refers to as ‘moods’, maintains that ex-
istential feelings provide the basis for further experience and 
thought, including delusional thoughts. Josef Parnas (2013) 
suggests that depressive delusions deal with the worldly affairs 
in which patients are engaged and for which they seek evi-
dence. As depressive delusions have a direct link to previous 
experience and are about everyday feelings, Parnas calls them 
‘empirical’, to distinguish them from the more ‘metaphysical’ 
delusions that give an insight into the nature of reality and are 
typical of schizophrenia. 
Learning about  
the self in depression
According to Swiss developmental psychologist Jean 
Piaget (1977), there are different stages of cognitive devel-
opment explaining how children acquire and process knowl-
edge. Some of Piaget’s findings have been used to explain 
cognitive abnormalities in mental disorders such as schizo-
phrenia and depression (e.g., Beck et al., 1979). Here we are 
going to refer to one of Piaget’s concepts, the equilibration of 
cognitive structures model (hereafter, ECS) in order to shed 
light on the mechanisms involved in the acquisition of self-re-
lated beliefs in depression. 
The central concept in the ECS model is that of a schema. 
A schema can be defined as a set of linked mental representa-
tions of the world, which people use both to understand new 
situations and to respond to them. In other words, the sche-
ma is a stored representation of a pattern of behaviour. For 
example, a person might have a schema about buying a meal 
in a restaurant, which includes looking at a menu, ordering 
food, eating, and paying the bill. Whenever a person with this 
schema finds herself in a restaurant, she retrieves the schema 
from memory, and applies it to her situation. Piaget described 
how schemata were acquired and modified. 
According to the ECS model, when the person’s existing 
schemata can explain what she experiences, then we have a 
state of equilibrium, or cognitive balance. Two key processes 
are required for maintaining cognitive balance: assimilation, 
which is using an existing schema to deal with a new object 
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or situation; and accommodation, which happens when the ex-
isting schema does not correctly apply to a new situation and 
needs to be modified as a result. A correct development of 
cognitive structures (also called ‘adaptation’) requires effec-
tive implementation of both processes, assimilation and ac-
commodation. If one of the two processes does not perform 
its function, the other one attempts to compensate to ensure 
adaptation. The main aim is to avoid conflicting cognitions 
and maintain coherence. Processes such as assimilation and 
accommodation serve this purpose.
When equilibrium cannot be achieved, increased levels 
of stress and anxiety are experienced. Consider the following 
example:
Raymond, seeing a panther for the first time, 
says, ‘look, there is a black leopard.’ He has 
fit the new animal into an existing mental 
structure because he is already familiar with 
leopards and just assumes that the panther 
is a leopard of a different colour. He is using 
assimilation, making the new information fit 
into what he already knows. Monique, how-
ever, has never visited a zoo and has seen 
some wild animals only on television or in 
books. Seeing unfamiliar llamas she con-
siders what these might be. They resemble 
horses, but Monique immediately dismisses 
this category because she knows that hors-
es have smooth hair and shorter necks. She 
also dismisses camels because she knows 
they have humps on their backs. She de-
cides finally that this must be an animal she 
does not know and asks the teacher what it 
is. Monique is using accommodation, creat-
ing a new concept into which this new in-
formation can be fitted (Essa, 2012, p. 117).
Seeing llamas for the first time and not being able to cat-
egorise them causes a state of cognitive dissonance. This state 
resembles Piaget’s lack of equilibrium and is defined as the 
mental stress or discomfort experienced by an individual who 
holds two or more contradictory beliefs, ideas, or values at the 
same time; performs an action that is contradictory to one 
or more beliefs, ideas, or values; or is confronted by new in-
formation that conflicts with existing beliefs, ideas, or values 
(Festinger, 1957, 1962). 
The theory of cognitive dissonance helps us understand 
the extent to which people strive for coherence. When people 
experience inconsistent cognitions, they become psychologi-
cally uncomfortable and are motivated to reduce the incon-
sistency—as well as actively avoid situations and information 
likely to increase it (Festinger, 1957). When people are con-
fronted with information that conflicts with their previous 
beliefs and cannot change such beliefs, they attempt to re-
store consistency in other ways, for instance by reinterpreting 
their experience, rejecting the new information, or seeking 
additional support for the previous beliefs from other people 
who share such beliefs (Harmon-Jones, 2002). There is ev-
idence suggesting that people who remain in a state of cog-
nitive dissonance for a prolonged period of time experience 
increased levels of anxiety and symptoms resembling those of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (Eysenck, 2013). 
The hypothesis we wish to explore and ultimately de-
fend is that people with severe depression acquire increasing-
ly negative beliefs about themselves because the process by 
which they acquire self-related information is disrupted. The 
balance between assimilation and accommodation is com-
promised in that people with depression become increasingly 
less able to use accommodation as a way of processing new 
self-related information. Instead, they distort the content of 
newly acquired information in order to assimilate it success-
fully and making it consistent with their previous beliefs. 
As we saw, people use schemata to understand the world, 
including themselves, and to learn from their experiences. 
Schemata have been shaped by past experiences, memories, 
social interactions, and conscious reflection, as well as by a 
number of other factors. Human experiences vary, and people 
who experience more harmful events throughout their lives 
may come to store self-related representations that are more 
negative. Schemata can be modified and when this happens, 
learning occurs. When people are not able to assimilate new 
information because it does not match their schemata, they 
modify their schemata in order to accommodate the new in-
formation. 
We know from the literature on depressive realism that 
people who experience symptoms of mild depression, specif-
ically low mood, tend to adopt more accurate beliefs about 
themselves (see Bortolotti and Antrobus, 2015, for a recent 
review). These judgements may include judgements about 
their own performance, estimation of future self-related 
events, or memories of the type of feedback they received. 
Whilst at least in some circumstances people with low mood 
perceive and assess themselves more accurately than people 
with no depressive symptoms, people affected by severe forms 
of depression form negatively biased beliefs about themselves 
and their circumstances. The more severe depressive symp-
toms do they have, the more negative self-related beliefs they 
adopt. Indeed, people who experience major depressive disor-
der often have critically low self-esteem, perceive themselves 
as incapable and helpless, are filled with guilt and regrets, and 
believe that they deserve punishment (Goodwin and Jami-
son, 1990). They become their most severe critics and their 
harshest enemies; their thoughts become ruminative and 
centre on self-condemnation. 
A hypothesis about the 
development of depressive 
delusions
Cognitive models share the premise that maladaptive 
thinking and negative assessments of the self contribute to 
the development of depression. Aaron Beck’s original theory 
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(Beck, 1967; Beck et al., 1979) served as the catalyst for an 
explosion of research on the so-called ‘cognitive vulnerabili-
ty to depression’ (Ingram, 1984; Teasdale and Barnard, 1993; 
Teasdale, 1997; Ingram et al., 1998; Hankin and Abramson, 
2001; Abramson et al., 2002; Beevers, 2005). Some of the 
most recent cognitive models of depression have involved a 
refinement and further articulation of the basic model, which 
has it that maladaptive cognition contributes to the onset of 
depression in the context of stressful life circumstances (Do-
zois and Beck, 2008). For our purpose, which is to understand 
the nature of depressive delusions, it is useful to briefly revisit 
this model. 
Beck (1967) argues that there are three main levels of 
thinking involved in the onset, maintenance, and aggravation 
of depression: depressive self-schemata, maladaptive beliefs, and 
negative automatic thoughts. Schemata are central to Beck’s 
cognitive model. Although they have been defined in a vari-
ety of ways, most definitions incorporate the idea that they 
consist of both structural properties and propositional ele-
ments (Ingram et al., 1998; Dozois and Beck, 2008). As an 
organized structure, a schema is often adaptive insofar as it 
facilitates the speed with which people process information. 
However, well-organized internal representations are some-
times associated with a cost: the information may be selec-
tively attended to, encoded, and retrieved in a manner that 
is coloured by one’s internal representation. For instance, a 
schema of the typical Italian person (emotional, pasta-eating, 
coffee-drinking, etc.) may give rise to stereotypical, and ulti-
mately incorrect, beliefs about how a group of persons is likely 
to behave (Linville, 1982). 
In the case of depression, the efficiency associated 
with the use of a schema involves a bias toward attending 
to, encoding, and retrieving schema-consistent (that is, neg-
ative) information about the self, at the expense of positive 
or neutral information. Previous experience and knowledge 
structures influence the processing of new information, and 
self-schemata “are considered dysfunctional in that they em-
body a constellation of dysfunctional attitudes that lead to 
negative perspectives about oneself, the world, and the future” 
(Scher et al., 2005, p. 489). 
According to Beck, depressive self-schemata develop 
during early childhood but remain hidden until activated later 
in life by adverse circumstances (see Beck et al., 1979; James et 
al., 2007; Young et al., 2003). Leslie who is vulnerable to depres-
sion has core beliefs about being fundamentally inept and un-
lovable. She does not succumb to depression, however, as long 
as her core beliefs are not activated. Once her negative self-sche-
ma is triggered by an experience of rejection, Leslie becomes 
vulnerable to information processing biases (see Scher et al., 
2005) and experiences negative thoughts that focus on themes 
of loss, failure, worthlessness, defectiveness, incompetence, and 
inadequacy (Beck et al., 1985; Beck et al., 1979). 
When depressive self-schemata are activated by neg-
ative life experiences, cognitive errors, and negative auto-
matic thoughts follow (Dozois and Beck, 2008). Automatic 
thoughts refer to the stream of cognitions that arise by asso-
ciation in people’s day-to-day lives and are not accompanied 
by any direct consideration or volition. Automatic thoughts 
are more superficial and proximal to the given stimulus than 
are thoughts at higher levels of cognition, and are function-
ally related to people’s deeper beliefs. They are the cognitive 
by-products of activated schemata. Different aspects of peo-
ple’s core belief system are activated by external environmen-
tal cues, or as reactions to internal states and emotions (Do-
zois and Beck, 2008). These thoughts usually take the form of 
a negative view of the self, the world, or the future, what Beck 
et al. (1979) called the cognitive triad. 
To sum up, cognitive models of depression rely on the 
activation of negative self–schemata triggered by adverse life 
circumstances. In our example, Leslie adopts increasingly 
negative beliefs about herself that contribute to her experi-
encing depressive symptoms. Compatibly with Beck’s cog-
nitive model of depression, one can argue that in depressive 
illness the process of accommodating new information about 
oneself in one’s self-schemata is disrupted, and works selec-
tively. People suffering from depression are not capable of 
successful accommodation, that is, they cannot modify their 
negative representations of themselves to match new, contra-
dicting information. Because the new information cannot be 
assimilated in its original form, people distort its content in 
order to match their self-schemata, and then they assimilate 
the distorted content. In this way, they compensate for the 
missing part of the adaptation process, and avoid dissonance. 
The empirical literature provides strong evidence in 
support of this hypothesis. For example, it has been shown 
that people with depression verify their self-representa-
tions by seeking negative – rather than positive – appraisals 
(Swann et al., 1992a). Similarly, people suffering from dys-
phoria or depression prefer unfavourable evaluations and 
relationship partners who offer such evaluations (Swann et 
al., 1992b). Although people with depression desire praise, 
they also seek confirmation for their own negative self-relat-
ed judgments. Their desire to obtain confirmation for their 
own negative self-related judgements overrides the desire for 
praise (Swann, 1990), and their efforts to obtain confirmation 
intensify when others’ positive appraisals present a challenge 
to their self-views (Ingram, 2009). Using Festinger’s cognitive 
dissonance framework, we can say that, as positive appraisals 
contradict the person’s negative self-schema, they become a 
source of cognitive dissonance and anxiety. Because of that, 
they are rejected. 
The process goes as follows: 
(i)    New information becomes available that does not 
match the existing self-schema.
(ii)   The accommodation process is disrupted. There-
fore the modification of the schema in order to 
match the new information is not possible.
(iii)  The new information gets distorted in order to be 
assimilated in the existing negative schema.
(iv) Extremely negative self-related beliefs are adopted.
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Here is an example. John sees himself as a bad father. He 
works long hours and travels on business most weekends. He 
feels permanently guilty for not giving his children the time 
they deserve. He brings his children little souvenirs from his 
trips. The children are always excitedly waiting for his return 
home and seem to be very grateful for the gifts. However, see-
ing their joy and love does not change John’s view of himself 
as a bad father. He believes that the children smile because 
they were told by their mother to show gratitude. ‘They hate 
me and one day they will be tired of pretending’ – he thinks. 
In the example, John has a negative schema of himself – 
let us call this ‘a bad father’ self-representation. There is noth-
ing peculiar about it – people have negative representations of 
themselves that apply to various aspects of their lives. When 
confronted with contradicting evidence, i.e. the joy and grat-
itude of his children, John is unable to assimilate the fact that 
he makes his children happy, as it does not match his ‘bad 
father’ schema. Unlike many other people, he is also unable 
to accommodate this new information by modifying his rep-
resentation of himself. In order to successfully complete the 
process of adaptation and to maintain coherence, John dis-
torts the new information in order to preserve his negative 
self-schema and he interprets his children’s joy as an act of 
pretence.
The process of what we may call selective or distorted 
assimilation is repeated every time contradicting data be-
come available. The self-schema expands, enriched with 
new matching content. The more of the self-related negative 
content is assimilated into a schema, the more difficult it be-
comes to modify the schema. The so-called ‘depressive vul-
nerability’ described by Beck can be seen as a large number 
of related negative self-schemata. Some people hold negative 
self-representations that apply to many areas of their lives but 
do not develop clinical symptoms: this is due to their ability 
to modify self-representations in order to assimilate new, pos-
itive information about themselves. They gradually come to 
perceive themselves in a better light. 
However, accommodation does not work for everybody, 
and depression emerges as a consequence. Positive informa-
tion becomes distorted in order to be assimilated in negative 
self-representations, and thus existing self-schemata expand, 
enriched with apparently matching content. Negative self-re-
lated information is quickly assimilated, because it matches 
the existing schemata that become more and more articulat-
ed. The expansion of negative self-schemata is reflected in the 
judgments that people with depression express about them-
selves: ‘I am worthless’, ‘I have done nothing good in my life’, ‘I 
deserve to be punished’, etc. 
Why do people with depression distort new positive 
information to match their negative self-representations? 
Living in an almost perpetual mental state of cognitive dis-
sonance resulting from the inability to carry out a successful 
adaptation would cause overwhelming stress and anxiety. 
Judgements such as ‘I am worthless’ keep the anxiety caused 
by cognitive dissonance at bay, but may be another source of 
anxiety due to their content which emphasises loss, depriva-
tion, self-deprecation, and hopelessness (Beck, 1967; Beck et 
al., 1979; Dozois and Beck, 2008). A person who experienc-
es severe depression resolves cognitive dissonance but only 
temporarily: John’s negative self-appraisal of himself as a bad 
father, and his sense of guilt, lead him to expect lack of af-
fection and detachment from his children, which he believes 
he deserves. However, as his ‘bad father’ beliefs do not neces-
sarily represent reality accurately, the reaction he expects is 
not observed, and the coherence of his self-representation is 
under threat again. 
Psychological and epistemic 
benefits of depressive delusions 
According to the ECS model, preserving consistency is 
a priority for human cognition (Festinger, 1957, 1962; Brehm 
and Cohen, 1962; Abelson, 1968; Elliot and Devine, 1994; 
Goetzmann and Peles, 1997). People have a general tendency 
to restore coherence between their views, and between their 
views and the views of others, when this is compromised 
(Heider, 1946). If a person finds herself in a state of extreme 
cognitive dissonance, she needs to validate her prior beliefs 
and offset the cognitive dissonance emerging from those be-
liefs and newly acquired information. Mood-congruent delu-
sions in depression play this key role. In particular, they may 
offer validation for one’s own intensively experienced guilt, 
shame, hopelessness, and dismay. 
The claim that one is being spied upon in one’s own 
home – for example –matches the belief that one is not trust-
worthy and should be monitored at all times. Undoubtedly 
such delusions come with psychological costs. The delusion-
al content is weaved with unpleasant, sometimes terrifying 
events, such as being watched, followed, or threatened. But, 
by reducing dissonance, delusions also offer psychological re-
lief from dissonance–related anxiety. The delusion–induced 
anxiety that replaces the dissonance-related anxiety has the 
advantage of reinstating consistency: the negative beliefs 
about the self are confirmed. 
Is the hypothesis that depressive delusions validate and 
confirm prior beliefs about the self compatible with the pre-
diction-error theory of delusion formation (Fletcher and 
Frith, 2009; Corlett et al., 2007; Griffiths et al., 2014) which 
has already been applied to delusions in schizophrenia? Ac-
cording to the model proposed by Philip Corlett and col-
leagues for schizophrenic delusions, delusions are formed in 
response to aberrant prediction-error signals, those signals 
that indicate a mismatch between expectation and actual ex-
perience (Miyazono et al., 2014). A prediction error happens 
when new incoming information does not match the person’s 
existing representations (schemata) and, therefore, cannot be 
successfully integrated in the person’s model of the world (as-
similated). It indicates that the internal model of the world 
from which the prediction is derived is incorrect and needs to 
be updated. By updating the model in such a way as to mini-
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mize prediction errors, the person gains a better understand-
ing of the world. In this framework, prediction-error signals 
play a fundamental role in learning.
In a recent reconstruction of the stages of delusion for-
mation in schizophrenia (Mishara and Corlett, 2009), three 
stages are identified: 
(i)    Anxious expectation, when the agent bombarded with 
prediction-error signals is constantly expecting some-
thing important to happen and the processes under-
lying automated and habitual learning are disrupted.
(ii)   Revelation, when the delusion is formed putting an 
end to overwhelming anxiety and to the sense of 
unpredictability. The events previously experienced 
as inexplicable and distressing no longer require 
attention and the processes underlying automated 
and habitual learning resume their normal function. 
The person’s model of the world has been updated 
to include the delusion.
(iii)  Reinforcement, when the delusion is stamped into the 
agent’s memory and reinforced every time the pre-
vioulsy inexplicable events are experienced.
Prediction-error theorists argue that abnormal predic-
tion-error signaling contributes to the formation of delusions 
(Miyazono et al., 2014). In particular, they hypothesize that 
in people with delusions prediction-error signals are exces-
sive and they are produced when there is no real mismatch 
between expectation and experience. The excessive predic-
tion-error signals falsely indicate that the person’s internal 
model of the world needs to be updated even though, as a 
matter of fact, it does not have to be. 
In the case of depressive delusions, the process differs as 
people err on the side of conservatism as opposed to revisionism. 
Instead of changing their representation of the world to match 
the unusual experience, validating new experience at the ex-
pense of previously acquired beliefs, people with depressive 
delusions preserve their representation of themselves despite 
the new information that conflicts with it, validating the ex-
isting self-schemata at the expense of the new information 
that is reinterpreted and distorted to fit the schema. When 
this happens, in the language of the ECS model, an adaptation 
process has to occur for the system to regain cognitive bal-
ance. If the person is unable to update her internal model on 
the basis of the incoming data, she will reinterpret and distort 
the content of the data in order to match the schema. The 
delusions that emerge are mood-congruent and bringing val-
idation to the original, negatively biased, self-representation. 
In the prediction-error model described by Corlett and 
colleagues, the adoption of delusions in schizophrenia has 
some positive contribution to make and delusions should not 
be seen exclusively as a deficit. In particular, the claim is that, 
in the context of the disruption of the learning process caused 
by excessive prediction-error signals, delusions “permit con-
tinued engagement with an overwhelming world, and ongo-
ing function in the face of paralyzing difficulty” (Fineberg and 
Corlett, 2016, p. 73). The claim makes reference to the notion 
of epistemic innocence that has been applied to motivated delu-
sions and elaborate and systematised delusions in schizophre-
nia (Bortolotti, 2015, 2016). Can this notion be applied also 
to depressive delusions?
Epistemically innocent cognitions are not necessarily 
free from epistemic faults, but they do have significant epis-
temic benefits that would be unattainable otherwise (Borto-
lotti, 2015, p. 495). Our suggestion is that, if the adoption of a 
delusional hypothesis helps avoid bad epistemic consequences 
and adopting another (non-delusional) hypothesis would not 
have the same benefit, then the adoption of the delusional hy-
pothesis is an acceptable response to what we can view as an 
emergency situation.
Here are the two conditions for the epistemic innocence 
of delusions:
  Epistemic benefit: The adoption of the delusional hy-
pothesis confers a significant epistemic benefit to a giv-
en agent at a given time. 
  No alternatives: Alternative hypotheses that would 
confer the same benefit are not available to that agent 
at that time.
Some qualifications are in order. First, what counts as 
an epistemic benefit may vary. One might say that adopting a 
delusion is epistemically beneficial if it contributes to the ac-
quisition or retention of true beliefs, if it promotes the agent’s 
intellectual virtues, or if it is something an agent should be 
praised and not blamed for. One’s commitments in episte-
mology will affect the way in which the epistemic benefits are 
identified and described. In the case of depressive delusions, 
the main benefit seems to be the preservation of a coherent 
self-representation.
Second, different notions and degrees of unavailabili-
ty can explain the failure to adopt a less epistemically costly 
hypothesis. This spectrum of possibilities reflects the nature 
of the limitations that the agent experiences in the relevant 
context, ranging from standard reasoning limitations affect-
ing all human agents to deficits of perception, inference, or 
memory that may apply in clinical settings. For instance, with 
respect to delusions in schizophrenia, one may suggest that 
in the person who adopts a delusional hypothesis there is an 
impairment in the capacity to evaluate hypotheses on the ba-
sis of their plausibility before adopting them as beliefs (this is 
an idea developed in the context of the two-factor theory of 
delusion formation, as in Davies et al., 2001). Alternatively, 
one may suggest that the person is so overwhelmed by the 
delusional hypothesis that she does not even consider alterna-
tive interpretations of her unusual experience (as in Freeman 
et al., 2004). In the case of depressive delusions, the unavail-
ability of alternative hypothesis is driven by the process of 
negatively-biased learning we described earlier: people have 
long ignored positive information about themselves or re-in-
terpreted it with a negative spin, and this has not been inte-
grated in their self-schemata. 
Third, epistemic innocence applies to the adoption, 
not the prolonged maintenance, of delusional beliefs. The 
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benefit consists in avoiding a problem that presents itself 
when the unusual experience or the new evidence is not 
yet made sense of, and can generate anxiety, stress, tension. 
Delusions appear as a response to a critically high point (a 
‘tipping point’) of cognitive imbalance (or, quoting Jaspers, 
a ‘limit situation’), and their function is to reinstate the bal-
ance that has been lost. From an epistemic standpoint, by 
reducing dissonance and preventing the disintegration of 
the self, depressive delusions help restore the person’s narra-
tive identity. With reference to our previous example, John 
can preserve a concept of himself as a bad father, despite 
the reassurances of his wife and the gratitude expressed by 
his children, by distorting evidence that he is a good, highly 
appreciated, father. For the person who seeks consistency 
between her self-related beliefs and feelings and newly ac-
quired information, the depressive delusion offers a solution. 
But the benefit is temporary. When the delusion becomes 
entrenched, as we showed both in the case of schizophrenic 
and depressive delusions, it becomes a new source of stress, 
anxiety, and tension. 
To sum up, the most important function of depressive 
delusions seems to be that they restore the equilibrium be-
tween the cognitive processes responsible for adaptation. De-
pressive delusions contribute to the agent’s narrative identity 
by validating prior self-related beliefs and feelings that hap-
pen to be negatively biased. They can be considered as epis-
temically innocent, which means that they deliver significant 
epistemic benefits which could not be achieved otherwise.
Conclusions
In this paper we asked what depressive delusions are and 
whether they have the potential for psychological and epistem-
ic benefits. We argued that depressive delusions emerge as a 
result of the attempt to eliminate the inconsistency between 
self-schemata formed via a biased process of learning, and new 
conflicting information. Their function is to restore the equi-
librium of the cognitive processes of adaptation, assimilation, 
and accommodation. New information is distorted in order to 
be assimilated and integrated in previously acquired self-sche-
mata, which consist of negatively biased self-related beliefs and 
feelings. Due to their reducing dissonance and providing the 
basis for a unified narrative self, depressive delusions have the 
potential to deliver both psychological and epistemic benefits 
by relieving dissonance-induced anxiety and preserving a co-
herent self-concept. But in the long run, their distressing con-
tent causes serious psychological harm, and the mounting evi-
dence against the self-schemata they are designed to preserve is 
destined to compromise the person’s delicate cognitive balance. 
In this paper we have not offered an exhaustive account 
of delusions in depression, but highlighted the need for more 
research into this fascinating and under-studied phenome-
non. Our preliminary consideration of the literature suggests 
that the experience of depressive delusions is on a spectrum 
with everyday experiences of attempting to maintain a pre-
viously acquired belief by reinterpreting new evidence that 
conflicts with it, and thus makes the cognitive mechanisms 
responsible for depressive delusions continuous with those 
underlying non-pathological beliefs. A better understand-
ing of depressive delusions can offer some insights into the 
challenges faced by a person with a major depressive episode 
accompanied by psychotic symptoms, and pave the way for 
interventions that respect the complexity of the delusional 
experience, both its highly distressing long-term effects and 
its temporary adaptive features.
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